Buongiorno a tutti!
Tra le tante ‘lenti’ con cui ci affacciamo alla nostra odierna realtà, vorrei proporvi quella di Manlio Graziano, professore di geopolitica presso l’Università della Sorbona, attraverso la condivisione di due suoi articoli. In primo luogo perché, da profana della materia, grazie alla sua figura e i suoi scritti, ho avuto modo di approcciarmi alla geopolitica, e di comprendere come sia una materia tanto poliforme da essere persino priva di un’univoca definizione, e chi meglio di noi ‘classicisti’ potrebbe approcciarvisi con una visione d’insieme tanto amplia e fresca della storia antica funzionale al nostro presente? Il professore ci pone una domanda, con cui intitola il primo articolo: "Who Will Pay for the War Against Covid, and Until When?".
La struttura a cui siamo posti di fronte, che non sempre noi ragazzi manteniamo vicino alla nostra quotidianità, è in maniera inevitabile parte della nostra vita: l’economia. Essa è alla base dell’organizzazione dell’utilizzo di risorse di un paese, e la stessa parola -dal greco οἶκος e νόμος – ci ricorda quanto sia importante che l’individuo rimanga al centro e costantemente informato di quei sistemi internazionali da cui sembra alienato o di cui non possegga alcun controllo, la nostra ‘non conoscenza’ di questi ultimi, ovvero ignoranza, è il nostro primo limite. Mentre all’interno del secondo ci pone una seconda difficile questione, sottolineata anche dal presidente del Parlamento Europeo, David Sassoli: la difficoltà dell’Europa a rimanere unita e di dimostrare la sua solidarietà.
Oggi ci risulta difficile agire concretamente, tuttavia possediamo un’arma di cui nessuno può privarci: la nostra mente. È per questo che ho voluto portare davanti a voi due articoli, mi è piaciuta l’idea di invitare alla lettura, ormai è una sfida, una risorsa e una possibilità. Mi auguro che l’argomento, come per me, possa permettere di chiederci, comprendere e riflettere sulla realtà concreta di ciò che viviamo, sentendoci parte di meccanismi di cui siamo primo fondamento e parte necessaria.
Buona lettura!
Atenas Fusco, classe V A
__________________________________________________________________
23/3/2020 - Viral Debt. Who Will Pay for the War Against Covid, and Until When?
No one is asking where the money will come from. Or how – and when, or if – it will be paid back - by Manlio Graziano
The dramatic spread of the Covid-19 virus has prompted equally dramatic responses – and rhetoric – from the world’s political leaders.
“We are at war,” said France’s Emmanuel Macron. And in Washington, Donald Trump declared himself to be a “wartime president.”
But war is expensive. In the face of what many see as an existential threat, Trump, Macron and other leaders have vowed to “do whatever it takes” to defeat the virus. But there’s a subtext, which is: “we will spend whatever it costs.”
The talk is of not just billions, but even trillions of dollars. National legislatures have been approving spending at these levels. And many citizens do not blink. They take it for granted that today’s “providential” states have pockets as deep as they need to be, that the money will be found. And that if governments fail to do so, it is because they are under the sway of elites, Wall Street, the 1 percent, you name it.
Yet no one is asking where the money will come from, or how – and when, or if – it will be paid back.
Without in any way questioning the urgency of the threat to public health, or the earnestness or ultimate goodwill of various governments’ responses, this march toward the unknown raises questions – and red flags – in the minds of political analysts with a grounding in history. For they know that when politicians trumpet their unshakable faith in final victory – victory at any cost – they don’t always win.
Indeed, as the history of the last century clearly demonstrated, final victory is more likely to go to those who promise only blood, sweat and tears than those who preen and swagger from balconies.
So this discussion is not about the steps needed to defeat the virus – I leave that to the experts in public health.
But someone needs to seriously consider the social, and therefore political, and therefore international, ramifications of this “whatever-it-takes” thinking – and to ponder what could be some disastrous unintended consequences in the post-pandemic world.
No leader has begun to suggest how all this spending will be funded – through “war” bonds, or a variety of contributions or sacrifices to be made by ordinary citizens during the “war”?
This is the elephant in the room.
In trying times like these, every political leader promises that no one will suffer – at least not much. The state will “take care of” any problem that arises.
But again: With what money?
In the United States, Trump rarely even mentions the deficit – though it is a favorite subject of Republicans when they are out of power. In France, Macron has pushed aside all previous talk of reducing the deficit. Virus-related spending by hard-hit Italy is certain to push its 2020 budget deficit above the EU’s ceiling of 3 percent of national output, but the European Commission says it will allow this, given the circumstances.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Angela Merkel also agree.
Ordinary citizens don’t always understand the thinking here. If seemingly almost unlimited funds can be found for this, why couldn’t they be found in normal times? Was it because they – they being a billionaire president, or the 1 percent, or corrupt leaders, or European bureaucrats, or the vultures of the financial world, perhaps even immigrants — wanted to prevent us from having it?
(It’s interesting that people only seem to protest against corruption once there is no money left for them: Italians began insulting Bettino Craxi only at the end of a decade during which he had filled their pockets with money.)
But the harsh reality is that we are running out of money – and were even before the virus struck. So political leaders make promises they cannot keep, and commit their nations to spending that others will have to pay for at a far higher price (as in Donald Trump’s notorious “I won’t be here” when it all blows up).
There are some clear and identifiable problems here.
Problem No. 1: like Pinocchio when he confronted the Cat and Fox’s tree of money growing overnight in the Field of Miracles, people are lulled into believing what they want to believe, which is most comforting – not the hard, cold realities about how wealth is actually created as explained by classic economic theories. The conventional wisdom is that money is a variable independent from the “real” economy. For some American liberals, this means the idea that government can go on “printing money” without risk of inflation – since the entire world trusts and will support the dollar. This illusory notion that while real production goes one way, finance can go another may keep people happy – the stock market can continue going up for a time even if real production is going down – but eventually the bubble bursts and order is restored.
Painfully and disruptively. Keynesianism has never really worked: even less today with current debt levels.
Problem No. 2: the “entitlement culture”. A culture in which people believe that society, a company or government owes them something and they do not have to earn it or deliver value for what they receive. But eventually, the money runs out, and there are jolting socio-political consequences (as we observe since the 2008 crisis).
Problem No. 3: over-reliance on public debt; and an unwillingness to confront reality. When the conditions that had allowed countries to afford free welfare for all disappear, governments tend to gradually increase public debt in order to compensate. More and more public money is spent to give the impression that those earlier conditions still exist. Instead, declining powers need to come to grips with the reality: They will never be great again.
Problem No. 4: demography. All of the above factors are converging at a time when a growing and aging world population is putting unprecedented pressures on pensions and healthcare, making demography the worst of these problems. Last year’s UN World Population Prospects posits a “catastrophe scenario” that could take shape by 2050, with money finally running out to pay pensions and provide healthcare for the elderly (or to pay the salaries of those who work to support the elderly). For possible consequences, see “The Case for Killing Granny” (Newsweek, Sept 21, 2009). By 2050, according to the UN, the “richer countries” will be able to keep their welfare states alive only if 380 million immigrants go to work there. Yet these countries continue to reject, and even in some cases to demonize, the immigrant laborers who could save them. The announced measures to deal with coronavirus will further aggravate this problem by closing borders.
Problem No. 5: the market catastrophe. Macroeconomic consequences will aggravate the debt crisis (the debt/GDP ratio will worsen on both fronts) – and the urgent measures adopted at the outset of the 2008 recession are no longer readily available, as resources are now insufficient.
Problem No. 6: fragmented alliances. Amid the rise of protectionism, border walls and our-nation-first policies, we are seeing none of the global coordination we saw in 2008; indeed, an every-man-for-himself approach will pull everyone down.
In sum, the world stands at an extremely perilous precipice, one with at least some ominous echoes of an earlier time in history.
Adolf Hitler won election by making a Keynesian promise to end unemployment; he kept his promise by emptying the state coffers. When there was nothing left, and no one would lend to the German state, the only possible solution was war.
And it was war – not Roosevelt’s New Deal – that got the United States out of the Depression.
History does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes, it has been said. And one word that rhymes with war is…war.
(English editing by Brian Knowlton. Title © Fabio James Petani)
__________________________________________________________________
16/4/2020 - Europe’s solidarity trap - Limes
The true division runs not between North and South, but between those who spend the others’ money and those who pay the others’ bills. by Manlio Graziano
In late March, old Jacques Delors made a brief appearance back on the public stage to sound a somber warning: If Europe fails to demonstrate solidarity in these difficulttimes, it will be headed toward “mortal danger.”
It is hard to argue with this.
At Easter, Pope Francis himself weighed in: “This is not a time for self-centeredness…
After the Second World War, this beloved continent was able to rise again, thanks to a concrete spirit of solidarity that enabled it to overcome the rivalries of the past,” he said.
The pontiff specifically invoked the European Union, saying it was “facing an epochal challenge, on which will depend not only its future but that of the whole world.”
Again, it is hard to argue with this.
And yet the continent’s leaders find themselves confronted with a choice between two highly unpleasant alternatives. For not only does the lack of solidarity pose a serious danger, but solidarity itself is steering Europe toward “mortal danger.”
The seemingly endless recent meeting of the European finance ministers wound up April 9 having produced a mere notional agreement, which felt very much like the postponement of any real decision. This compromise (and the reactions it provoked) demonstrated that the “microbe is back,” as Delors put it, using a metaphor sadly appropriate to the current situation. The “microbe” – for him as for most of the French, but also for the Italians – is precisely the lack of solidarity of Europe’s “North” toward its “South.”
The overused reference to North/South opposition, however, feels more like a call to arms designed to make the (supposedly selfish and self-centered) Northern countries give in, rather than a representation of reality. From 2014 to 2019, thanks also to the generous policies of the European Central Bank, several European Union member countries rolled up their sleeves to reduce their public debt: not only Germany and the Netherlands, but also Portugal, Spain and even Cyprus. In short, everyone but Greece, Italy and France. The true dividing line in Europe runs not between North and South, but between those who continue to spend knowing that others will eventually pay their bills (their notion of solidarity), and those who pay the others’ bills, Germany above all.
“Sources close to the Élysée,” writes Libération, have been delivering the following message: “If we start to say that Italy should have done more in the past (in order to) refuse all solidarity, the political cost will be enormous… If Italy finds itself back in a total economic depression under Europe’s indifferent gaze, we will have again Salvini in power.”
Those “sources close to the Élysée” are certainly right; from an electoral viewpoint, the theme of a Europe insensitive to the immediate vital needs of its weakest members is a gold mine, and Matteo Salvini exploits it well and with greater coherence than any of those who, by repeating his words, corroborate his arguments. But it doesn’t take any particular political intelligence to realize that, when these sources speak of Italy and Salvini, they are actually thinking of France (whose debt has risen even more rapidly than Italy’s) and of Marine Le Pen (who in recent times has become ‘She-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named,’ like Lord Voldemort).
Again, the sources are right, with one slight difference: While the “sovereignists” in power in Rome can, with some difficulty, be managed by a closely-knit Europe (meaning France plus Germany), having “sovereignists” in power in Paris would probably spell the death of the continental union. Thus making the different European countries the object of passive competition between the great powers which, at least by default, will remain great powers even after this crisis.
Here is the catch: Almost everyone seems to realize that a lack of European solidarity with Italy and France could propel Salvini and Le Pen to power. What most people tend to overlook, however, is the opposite scenario, but one which would produce the same, or even a worse, result: European solidarity with Italy and France could propel the “sovereignists” to power in Germany. If it is true that Italian and French voters can easily be roused to turn against Europe, and in particular against Germany, should the money to finance their governments’ expenses not materialize (and “without conditions,” if you please), it is equally true that German voters can easily be turned against Europe, in particular against Italy and France, once they see that they are being called on, yet again, to pay.
History has taught us that Germany can only exist by fusing itself into larger economic, political and military entities, in order to dilute its own strength and to avoid provoking the rise of hostile coalitions; but it doesn’t mean that German voters know it or that they consider it a priority, now. In fact, Germany is the only country that in theory would have the ability – if one overlooks its geopolitical constraints – of living without the Union: in 2019, it was the world’s fourth-largest economic power, the third-largest commercial power, the third in foreign investments and fourth in the UN’s Human Development Index.
The German voter might easily deduce from this that, without the weight of Europe holding it down, without repeatedly having to clean up others’ messes, the country could be even more prosperous than it is at present; and, to be sure, that it could work its way out of this crisis better than others.
There is no reason to believe that the virus of “My-Country-First” thinking might not infect German voters, too. For even in Germany (and especially during this transition to the post-Merkel period) plenty of politicians would be only too happy to exploit and fan the growing popular resentment over Germany’s role as Europe’s Zahlmeister, or treasurer, called time after time to bridge the gaps created by the budgetary carelessness of other EU countries.
An April 9 survey by the Politbarometer Institute of Mainz, Germany, found that 68 percent of Germans were favorable to providing European aid to the countries hardest hit by the crisis, ‘’to which Germany should be a major contributor.” However, if the current crisis is dealt with, as we hear more and more frequently, with “wartime” economic measures, there is little chance this percentage would be as high. For wartime economic measures would mean raising public debt to stratospheric levels.
And beyond a certain limit, there are only two ways to support such levels: one is a spectacular increase in production (an objective that appears out of reach for France or Italy); the other is to print more money, with the inevitable consequence of destroying a large part of people’s savings.
In Germany, memories of the hyperinflation of 1923 (but also of the June 1948 decision to replace the Reichsmark with the Deutsche mark, reducing the nominal value of the currency by 90 percent overnight), is now deeply rooted in the national psyche.
Considering that the number of people with substantial – and potentially devaluable – assets has grown exponentially since World War II, it is easy to imagine what would happen if the specter of a new hyperinflation should loom on the horizon.
France, for its part, is tiptoeing along a narrow and slippery path between two abysses.
On the one hand, the risk that its voters pull it out of the Union, condemning it to political and economic irrelevance (and thus to suffering even more dramatically the effects of the current crisis). On the other hand, the risk of provoking a similar reaction among German voters, leaving France not only without the Union, but plunging it 100 years back in history, when its mortal enemy was – precisely – Germany.
To be sure, none of these scenarios has yet been written. Geopolitics, as Robert Kaplan puts it, is a “battle against fate”. Assuming, that is, one knows which fate one needs to battle against.
(Translation by Brian Knowlton)
